











Working Paper No 81
CEFIR / NES Working Paper series
September 2006Money Creation in a Random Matching
Model∗
Alexei Deviatov†
The New Economic School
September 11, 2006
Abstract
I study money creation in versions of the Trejos-Wright (1995)
and Shi (1995) models with indivisible money and individual holdings
bounded at two units. I work with the same class of policies as in De-
viatov and Wallace (2001), who study money creation in that model.
However, I consider an alternative notion of implementability–the ex
ante pairwise core. I compute a set of numerical examples to determine
whether money creation is beneﬁcial. I ﬁnd beneﬁcial eﬀects of money
creation if individuals are suﬃciently risk averse (obtain suﬃciently
high utility gains from trade) and impatient.
JEL classiﬁcation: E31.
Keywords: inﬂation; Friedman rule; optimal monetary policy.
1 Introduction
The welfare eﬀects of lump-sum money creation diﬀer depending on the
model used. In particular, there seems to be a sharp contrast in results de-
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1pending on whether or not the model contains heterogeneous agents. Representative-
agent models tend to yield results in line with the Friedman rule: the optimal
monetary policy is not creation, but destruction ﬁnanced by taxes. Models
with heterogeneous agents do not give a general answer: in some the opti-
mal monetary policy is contractionary, in others it is expansionary.1 This
paper conﬁrms that result in a somewhat new model–actually, the familiar
matching model setting of Trejos-Wright (1995) and Shi (1995), but with a
notion of implementability that has not been used before to study the eﬀects
of money creation. Here a lottery allocation is implementable if it is in the
pairwise core (in every meeting).
My work is most closely related to Molico (2006) and to Deviatov and
Wallace (2001) who study money creation in versions of the same model.
Molico (2006) approximates divisible money and proceeds numerically us-
ing a particular bargaining solution–take-it-or leave-it oﬀers by consumers.
Hence, his work leaves open whether the results are special to that bargaining
solution. Deviatov and Wallace (2001) allow for any outcome which satisﬁes
ex post individual rationality in meetings and work with money holdings in
the set {0,1,2}, the smallest set that gives money creation a role in determin-
ing the distribution of money holdings. They get an analytical result–money
creation is beneﬁcial whenever agents are suﬃciently patient–but only be-
cause they do not permit those in a meeting to commit to lotteries. Here, I
adopt the same set of individual holdings but allow people in a meeting to
commit to lotteries, while at the same time requiring that the lottery trades
be in the pairwise core for every meeting.
I cannot get analytical results, and, therefore, proceed numerically. For
each example studied, I ﬁnd both the best rate of money creation and the best
pairwise-core lottery allocation. In other words, I allow the division of the
gains from trade in a meeting to depend both on the money creation rate and
on the money holdings of the consumer and producer in the meeting. I ﬁnd
that in general optima do not have take-it-or leave-it oﬀers or any other ﬁxed
bargaining rule except in settings where individuals are suﬃciently impatient.
In that case the optima have binding producer participation constraints in
all meetings, which implies take-it-or leave-it oﬀers by consumers.
For many settings I cannot ﬁnd beneﬁcial money creation. However, when
1Examples of models where it is expansionary include Imrohoroglu (1992), Levine
(1991) and a generalization by Kehoe, Levine and Woodford (1992), Deviatov and Wallace
(2001), Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2005), Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005),
and Molico (2006).
2people are both suﬃciently impatient and risk averse (obtain suﬃciently high
utility gains from trade), I ﬁnd that money creation is beneﬁcial. That is
quite diﬀerent from Deviatov and Wallace (2001), whose results apply only
if individuals are suﬃciently patient. In all examples where money creation
is beneﬁcial there is no randomization in meetings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
the description of the environment; in section 3 I deﬁne implementable allo-
cations; section 4 contains a discussion of some general properties of imple-
mentable allocations; in section 5 I describe the algorithm; section 6 presents
numerical examples; and section 7 concludes.
2 Environment
The background environment is a simple random matching model of money
due to Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995). Time is discrete and the
horizon is inﬁnite. There are N ≥ 3 perishable consumption goods at each
date and a [0,1] continuum of each of N types of agents. A type n person
consumes only good n and produces good n +1(modulo N). Each person
maximizes expected discounted utility with discount parameter β ∈ (0,1).
Utility in a period is given by u(y)−c(x),w h e r ey denotes consumption and
x denotes production of an individual (x,y ∈ R+).T h ef u n c t i o nu is strictly
concave, strictly increasing and satisﬁes u(0) = 0,w h i l et h ef u n c t i o nc is
convex with c(0) = 0 and is strictly increasing. Also, there exists ˆ y>0 such
that u(ˆ y)=c(ˆ y). In addition, u and c are twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
At each date, each agent meets one other person at random.
There is only one asset in this economy which can be stored across pe-
riods: ﬁat money. Money is indivisible and no individual can have more
than two units of money at any given time. Agents cannot commit to fu-
ture actions (except commitment to outcomes of randomized trades). Finally,
each agent’s specialization type and individual money holdings are observable
within each meeting, but the agent’s history, except as revealed by money
holdings, is private.
33 Implementable allocations and the optimum
problem
The timing in a period is the following. First, there are meetings and trades.
Then, the monetary policy is applied. The policy is a probabilistic version of
the proverbial helicopter drops of money. Then, the next period begins and
the above sequence of actions is repeated.
The pairwise meetings, the inability to commit, the privacy of individual
histories, and the perishable nature of the goods imply that any production
must be accompanied by a positive probability of receiving money. A trade
meeting is a meeting between a potential producer with i ∈ {0,1} units of
money and a potential consumer with j ∈ {1,2} units of money.
For each trade meeting, a general lottery trade is represented by a prob-
ability measure on R+ ×{ 0,1,2} with the interpretation that if (y,k) is
randomly drawn from that measure, then y is produced and consumed and
k units of money are transferred from the consumer to the producer. As is
obvious and spelled out below, only measures that are degenerate on output
can be in the pairwise core. Consequently, any trade in the pairwise core
can be described by the quantity of goods, yij,t r a d e di nm e e t i n g sb e t w e e n
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where tmm denotes a diagonal element of T (the probability that an individual
leaves the meeting with the same quantity m of money she brought into that
meeting). Because T is a transition matrix, tmm can be recovered from the
condition that each row of T sums to unity.
I use the formulation of policy introduced by Deviatov and Wallace (2001).
As I said, the policy constitutes a probabilistic version of the proverbial heli-
copter drops of money at a rate. Under policy (α,δ),a te a c hd a t ee a c hp e r s o n
4not at the upper bound receives a unit of money with probability α and then
each unit of money disintegrates with probability δ. As now explained, the
α part of the policy resembles lump-sum money creation, while the δ part is
a stand-in for the normalization that is equivalent to inﬂation.
With divisible money and no bound on individual holdings, the standard
policy is creation at a rate where money is handed out lump-sum to people.
In a broad class of settings, this policy is equivalent to such creation followed
by a proportional reduction in individual money holdings (see e.g. Lucas and
Woodford, 1994). The proportional reduction is nothing but a normalization
of individual holdings. Here, because individual holdings are bounded, such a
normalization is necessary. Moreover, because money holdings are indivisible,
both parts of the policy must be probabilistic. Also, because of the bound,
the α part only approximates lump-sum creation because a person at the
upper bound cannot receive such a transfer.
The standard policy (regardless of whether it is followed by a proportional
reduction in holdings or not) has two eﬀects. It shifts the distribution of real
money balances towards the mean and makes money less desirable to acquire
or retain. The above (α,δ)-policy also has these eﬀects. In particular, pro-
ducers are less willing to produce for money (because they may get a transfer
without production and may lose any money acquired) and consumers are
more willing to part with money (because they may get a transfer and may
lose money they retain).
I also follow Deviatov and Wallace (2001) in their interpretation of sequen-
tial individual rationality (which here is a part of the pairwise core notion)
as precluding direct taxes. That, among other things, implies that it is not
feasible to simply take money from people or to force producers to produce.
For that reason I consider only non-negative (α,δ)-policies.
Similar to trades, the creation and destruction parts of the policy yield a
pair of transition matrices for money holdings, denoted A and D respectively.
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5Then, our sequence of actions implies that the stationarity requirement is
pTAD = p.
It is convenient to express individual rationality and pairwise core con-
straints in terms of discounted expected utilities. Given a meeting of a pro-













Also, let µ denote the collection of all µij. For an allocation (p,µ,α,δ) that is
stationary, discounted expected utility of an agent who ends up with i units
of money at the end of the period, denoted vi, is constant. Then, the vec-
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. (3)
Note that an individual with no money can only expect to be a producer,
an individual with two units can only be a consumer, and a person with one
unit of money can be either a consumer or a producer.
Because T, A,a n dD are transition matrices and β ∈ (0,1),t h em a p p i n g
G(x) ≡ β(q0+TADx0) is a contraction. Therefore, (2) has a unique solution



















ij (ei+k − ei)ADv
0 − c(yij) (5)
be the expected gain from trade for the producer with i units of money in a









0 + u(yij) (6)
6be the gain from the same trade for the consumer (where el is the three-
component coordinate vector with indices running from 0 to 2).
The ex ante pairwise core notion of implementability gives rise to the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1. An allocation (p,µ,α,δ) is called ex ante pairwise core
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c
ij ≥ 0 (7)










for some γ consistent with the participation constraints (7), where the policy
(α,δ) and the value function v are taken as given.
In Deﬁnition 1, γ can depend on the meeting (i,j) and on the policy (α,δ).
Deﬁnition 1 says that an allocation is implementable if (i) it is stationary,
(ii) satisﬁes free disposal of money, (iii) satisﬁes individual rationality, and
(iv) there is no incentive for defections by pairs in meetings.
Finally, my optimum problem is to maximize ex ante utility. That is,
the optimum problem is to choose (p,µ,α,δ) from among those that are
implementable to maximize pv0 ≡ W.
It is useful to express the objective W in terms of returns. If I multiply

















pipj [u(yij) − c(yij)]. (9)
As one would expect, because for every consumer there is a producer, welfare





ij are strictly concave functions of y, randomization over
output cannot be a solution to (8).2 The proof proceeds by replacing any non-
degenerate distribution over output by its mean, which increases the objective
Πc
ij and relaxes the constraint Π
p
ij ≥ γ. Such degeneracy implies that my
optimum problem is ﬁnite dimensional. This allows me to characterize the
ex ante pairwise core in terms of the necessary ﬁrst order conditions. Because
of concavity of Π
p
ij and Πc
ij these necessary conditions are also suﬃcient. If
an allocation (p,µ,α,δ) has yij > 0 in all trade meetings,3 then the ﬁrst order























for all pairs (i,j) corresponding to trade meetings and transfers of positive
amounts of money k,w h e r eλ
k






The ﬁrst order conditions (10) yield a set of constraints which an ex
ante pairwise core implementable allocation must satisfy in addition to the
participation constraints in Deﬁnition 1. If the value function ADv0 implied
by an implementable allocation (p,µ,α,δ) is strictly concave, then (10) has
implications for the level of output in some meetings. In particular, if λ
k
ij > 0
and k ≥ j−i for some positive k,t h e nyij ≤ y∗, the unconstrained maximizer
of u(y) − c(y). Because the bound on individual holdings is two units, the
only meetings in which output can exceed y∗ are those between a producer
with zero and a consumer with two units of money.
5 The algorithm
Because the beneﬁcial external margin and harmful internal margin eﬀects
of money creation are at balance in any optimum, the optima always have
2Berentsen, Molico, and Wright (2002) introduce lotteries in a random matching model
of money and give a complete characterization of the ex ante pairwise core for the case of
one-unit bound on holdings.
3As u ﬃcient condition for this is that ADv0,w h e r ev is the value function implied
by an implementable allocation (p,µ,α,δ), is strictly increasing and that u0(0) = ∞ and
c0(0) = 0.
8some binding participation constraints. If individuals are patient enough, in
addition to binding participation constraints the optima have randomization
over how much money is transferred in meetings. This implies that some
of the constraints in (10) are also binding. Because these constraints are
complicated functions of an allocation, closed-form solutions for the optima
are out of reach even for the case of a two-unit bound on holdings. For this
reason I compute a set of examples.
My optimization problem falls within the class of problems generally re-
ferred to as “nonlinear programming problems”, for which many standard
routines are available. However, as one can see, the constraints in (10) are
discontinuous.4 Another diﬃculty is that the mapping F(p) ≡ pTAD − p
is ill-behaved at α = δ =0 .5 This precludes application of routines which
require continuous diﬀerentiability of the objective and constraints, such as
sequential quadratic programming. I overcome this diﬃc u l t yb yd e s i g n i n ga
hybrid algorithm which combines genetic and conventional smooth optimiza-
tion techniques.
There are three main steps in this algorithm. First, create an initial
population of allocations. Second, amend the population by replacing the
worst allocations by better ones. Third, check if the termination criterion is
satisﬁed for the best allocation in the population. If yes, then terminate; if
no, then return to the second step.
In the ﬁrst step, I create a matrix where each row is an allocation. Alloca-
tions in the initial population are picked randomly among those which satisfy
ex ante individual rationality. The size of the population is a parameter of
the algorithm.
To amend the population (the second step), I use several genetic oper-
ators. These operators are called selection, crossover, and mutation. I use
standard selection and crossover operators, a subset of those described in
Houck, Joines and Kay (1996). However, I modify the standard mutation




















where sign(x) is the sign function, and ϑ
k
ij is a slack variable.
5See Deviatov and Wallace (2001), who study the properties of that mapping.
9operator. The standard operator alters a single allocation (called “the par-
ent”) to produce another allocation (called “the child”). The operator I use
is a composition of two independent operators.
The ﬁrst one is applied only if the parent has at least one of the transfer
probabilities λ
k
ij at its upper or lower bound or if it has α = δ =0 .T h e
operator pushes a random subset of these variables into the interior. If a
better allocation is produced, it replaces the parent in the population. This
simple mutation deals with discontinuity of the constraints in (10) and with
ill behavior of the mapping F(p) at zero.
The second operator alters only those of the transfer probabilities and
policy pairs which are already in the interior. There, because all constraints
are twice continuously diﬀerentiable, application of smooth methods is possi-
ble. This leaves a range of possibilities for what this second operator can be.
In particular, one can run a few iterations of a sequential quadratic routine
or of the BFGS algorithm6 (as long as these iterations remain in the interior).
The operator I adopt makes use of the gradients in the following way.
First, I compute (reduced) gradients of the objective and of all active
constraints. Then I compute an orthogonal projection of the gradient of the
objective onto the subspace orthogonal to the one spanned by the gradients
of the active constraints. After that I randomly pick a search direction in the
neighborhood (small cone) of that projection. Going in that search direction
is likely to improve the objective and does not violate (at least by much)
the active constraints. The child is obtained from the parent by moving
along the search direction. However, this procedure often leads to a violation
of some constraints even if the parent satisﬁes all the constraints. In this
case the objective implied by the child is reduced by some value which is
proportional to the amount by which the constraints are violated. If the
penalty parameter is large, even a small violation is costly, and the child dies
out of the population quickly. If the parent itself violates the constraints by
large amounts, then the search direction is chosen to move the child closer to
the feasible region regardless of what happens to the objective. Because the
initial population is chosen randomly, this is important in the beginning of
search. In other words, the second operator ﬁrst pushes allocations towards
satisfaction of the pairwise core conditions; then it drives the population to
the optimum.
T h et e r m i n a t i o nc r i t e r i o ni nt h et h i r ds t e pi sb a s e do nt h eﬁrst order
6See Judd (1998) for further details.
10conditions for the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. If the length of the projection of
the gradient of the objective onto the subspace orthogonal to that spanned
by the gradients of the active constraints is less than the tolerance value, the
necessary conditions for the theorem are (approximately) satisﬁed. Because
the probability of selection of parents in the population is an increasing func-
tion of the objective, this is suﬃcient to guarantee that every terminal point
is a (local) maximum.
6 The examples
I use the above algorithm to compute examples of optimal allocations. In all
the examples, u(y)=yκ, c(y)=y,a n dN =3 . The examples are computed
for various κ and various degrees of patience, r,w h e r er ≡ 1
β − 1.
I ﬁnd examples where money creation is beneﬁcial provided that individu-
als are suﬃciently risk averse and impatient. However, an interesting ﬁnding
is that there are no examples where money creation is beneﬁcial and indi-
viduals randomize in meetings. It seems that when randomization is a part
of optimal trades, randomization itself produces beneﬁcial extensive margin
eﬀects that in some sense dominate those of a policy. To see why this con-
jecture seems plausible, consider allocations under no policy. If α = δ =0 ,









p0 + p1 + p2 =1 , and pi ≥ 0, (12)
yields the set of all stationary distributions. Then, if randomization is not
feasible, equation (11) deﬁnes a one-dimensional family of stationary distrib-
utions on the simplex (12). If the policy is applied, then it shifts the locus of
stationary distributions on that simplex. Deviatov and Wallace (2001) show
that under some parameters it is feasible to reach out distributions consistent
with an increased frequency of trades. That external margin (distribution)
eﬀect gives rise to higher ex ante utility in their model.
However, if randomization is feasible, there exist many randomization
schemes consistent with any distribution p being a stationary distribution.
Thus, an (α,δ)-policy no longer enlarges the set of feasible distributions.
11However, an expansionary policy tends to tighten producer participation
constraints. Because the optima tend to have binding producer participa-
tion constraints–and, hence, yij ≤ y∗–in many meetings (in all meetings
if individuals are suﬃciently impatient), the policy tends to reduce welfare
and, therefore, cannot be optimal.
There are two other features that are common to every example. First,
there are no binding consumer participation constraints. (This, however, is
not surprising because, as demonstrated in Berentsen, Molico and Wright
(2002), money has no value if the gain from trade for consumers is zero.)
Second, in a meeting of a producer with no money and a consumer with
two units, one unit of money changes hands with probability one. I take
advantage of these common features to simplify the description of results in
the tables below. I omit the probabilities of transfer of money in meetings of












11). I attach stars (∗) to outputs which correspond to binding pro-
ducer participation constraints and daggers (†) to the transfer probabilities
which correspond to binding ﬁrst order constraints in (10).
I compute two sets of examples. In the ﬁrst set I compute examples for
moderate risk aversion and patience, i.e. for all combinations of κ and r
from κ ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6} and r ∈ {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, ..., 0.25, 0.30,
0.35, 0.40, 0.50, 1.00}. Because I keep the cost function constant in all
examples, more risk averse individuals derive higher utility gains from trade
(i.e. u(y) − c(y)=yκ − y is a strictly decreasing function of κ for all y,
0 <y<b y =1 ).
I report a subset of these examples in Tables 1-3 (one table for each value
of risk aversion κ). All the results are consistent with the existence of four
diﬀerent regions with respect to the degree of patience r.I fr is small enough,
then the optima have randomization over the transfers of money in all three
trade meetings where transfers of only one unit are feasible. If r belongs to
the second region, then the optima have randomization over the transfers of
money only in meetings where the consumers have one unit. In meetings
of producers with one and consumers with two units, money changes hands
with probability one. In the next region the optima have randomization over
the transfers of money in meetings where both producers and consumers have
one unit. Finally, if r is big enough, one unit of money changes hands with
probability one in all trade meetings.
The examples are consistent with the transfer probabilities λ12, λ01,a n d
12λ11 being decreasing functions of patience. On the other hand, the optimum
quantity of money, p1 +2 p2, is an increasing function of patience, which is
not surprising because less money loosens producer participation constraints
(less money implies a higher probability of meeting other producers without
money in the future). In all examples where money creation is not beneﬁcial,
the fraction of individuals with one unit of money, p1, is an increasing function
of patience and increasing function of risk aversion. That leads me to surmise
that higher (utility) gains from trade and greater patience seem to increase
the extent to which external margin (distribution) eﬀect is beneﬁcial for
trade. However, when money creation is beneﬁcial, the optimal policy is not
a monotone function of patience, so that p1 is not monotone too. Also, there
is an increase in p1 when one moves from the region in parameter space where
money creation is not beneﬁcial to the region where it is beneﬁcial.
Examples in the ﬁrst set are consistent with the optima having at most
one nonbinding producer participation constraint, the one in meetings of
producers with nothing and consumers with two units of money. In a meeting
of a producer with one unit and a consumer with two, lowering the probability
of handing over money raises v2. That is helpful because it loosens producer
constraint in the (1,1) meeting, which, in turn, allows a decrease in λ11 and,
thus, an increase in p1 (and, thereby, in the frequency of trade). Because
λ11 is low, the participation constraint in the (1,1) meeting is binding and
the output is low. Likewise, a smaller probability of giving up money in the
(0,1) meeting lowers v0 which helps to relax the producer constraint in the
(0,2) meeting. This allows a higher y02 which, again, pushes up v2.T h i s
accounts for why y02 is so high in some examples. The same kind of eﬀect
on v2 c o u l db ea c h i e v e dw i t hap o s i t i v eλ
0
02, but that would reduce λ
1
02 and,
hence, the inﬂow into p1.
The second set of examples (reported in Table 4) shows optima for low
patience and high risk aversion (high utility gains from trade). Here I com-
pute examples for κ =0 .2 and r ∈ {0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0.95, 1.00, 1.10, 1.20,
1.50, 2.00, 3.00}.I fr is low, then the optima have randomization in meetings
and no policy. If r is high, then the optima have no randomization because
provided that individuals are highly impatient randomization becomes too
costly. In that case the optima have large (α,δ)-policies needed to sustain
distributions which imply high frequency of trade in meetings. Large (α,δ)
is incentive feasible when risk aversion κ is high because given higher util-
ity gains from trade, risk averse individuals are willing to trade money even
if acquisition of money is risky due to a high risk δ of subsequent loss of
13money. Also, in all examples where money creation is beneﬁcial, the optima
have take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers in all meetings – the bargaining rule assumed
by Molico (2006).
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper adds to the list of models where money creation is beneﬁcial.
Because I work with fully decentralized environment, analytical solutions are
not feasible, so I do a series of numerical examples. I compute examples
for a case of two-unit bound on individual money holdings. That bound is
the lowest for which money creation can have a beneﬁcial role. A natural
question is what happens for all higher bounds. It is intuitive that as the
bound gets larger, randomization plays a smaller and smaller role and, in the
limit, no role. The absence of examples where money creation is beneﬁcial
and individuals randomize in meetings leads me to surmise that beneﬁcial ef-
fects of money creation persist for all higher bounds. Moreover, as the bound
becomes large, it seems plausible that money creation will be beneﬁcial for
lower risk aversion and greater patience than in case of two-unit bound. That
conjecture seems somewhat diﬃcult to verify because the dimensionality of
the optimization problem is proportional to the cube of the bound and even
for a case of a three-unit bound numerical analysis is demanding. One way
to get around the curse of dimensionality is to work with environments with
partially centralized markets, where the distribution of money is “manage-
able”.7 However, that should be done with caution because the external
margin beneﬁcial eﬀect of money creation depends on having heterogeneity
in the model.
7See e.g. Lagos and Wright (2003) and Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2005).
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r 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50 1.00
α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
δ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p0 .2307 .2689 .3241 .3822 .4285 .4629 .4895 .5222 .5454 .6043
p1 .5593 .4936 .4263 .3894 .3628 .3417 .3246 .3025 .2950 .2727
p2 .2100 .2374 .2496 .2284 .2087 .1954 .1859 .1753 .1596 .1230
λ01 .2693† .4492† .8033† 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ12 .3896† .6435† 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ11 .1548† .2620† .4452† .5758† .6796† .7749† .8640† 1 1 1
y01 .2789∗ .2789∗ .2789∗ .2345∗ .1730∗ .1331∗ .1055∗ .0699∗ .0498∗ .0147∗
y12 .2789∗ .2789∗ .2342∗ .1445∗ .0973∗ .0686∗ .0501∗ .0285∗ .0179∗ .0033∗
y11 .1108∗ .1136∗ .1043∗ .0832∗ .0661∗ .0531∗ .0432∗ .0285∗ .0179∗ .0033∗
y02 .6945 .5769 .3472∗ .2345∗ .1730∗ .1331∗ .1055∗ .0699∗ .0498∗ .0147∗
Table 2: Optima when u(y)=x0.4. argmax[u(y) − y]=0 .2172.
r 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50 1.00
α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
δ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p0 .2022 .2437 .2715 .2892 .3197 .3448 .3660 .4046 .4327 .4834
p1 .6240 .5542 .5012 .4647 .4316 .4079 .3898 .3623 .3411 .3134
p2 .1738 .2021 .2273 .2461 .2487 .2473 .2442 .2331 .2262 .2032
λ01 .1419† .2495† .3793† .5081† .6756† .8439† 1 1 1 1
λ12 .2795† .4837† .7280† .9735† 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ11 .0903† .1604† .2456† .3294† .4267† .5125† .5884† .7188† .8412† 1
y01 .2172∗ .2172∗ .2172∗ .2172∗ .2172∗ .2172∗ .2142∗ .1600∗ .1255∗ .0529∗
y12 .2172∗ .2172∗ .2172∗ .2172∗ .1614∗ .1218∗ .0946∗ .0616∗ .0426∗ .0111∗
y11 .0702∗ .0720∗ .0733∗ .0735∗ .0689∗ .0624∗ .0556∗ .0442∗ .0358∗ .0111∗
y02 .6720 .5491 .4738 .4247∗ .3215∗ .2573∗ .2142∗ .1600∗ .1255∗ .0529∗
Note that for r =0 .01 the set of binding ﬁrst order constraints (10) includes binding inequality constraint
for λ1
02 w h i c hi sn o ts h o w ni nt h et a b l e .
17Table 3: Optima when u(y)=x0.2. argmax[u(y) − y]=0 .1337.
r 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.50 1.00
α 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .2498
δ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .1763
p0 .1494 .1925 .2244 .2448 .2600 .2721 .2824 .3022 .3232 .3686
p1 .7309 .6563 .5992 .5608 .5314 .5077 .4888 .4572 .4302 .3970
p2 .1197 .1512 .1764 .1944 .2086 .2202 .2288 .2406 .2466 .2344
λ01 .0453† .0908† .1475† .2021† .2565† .3106† .3611† .4668† .5872† 1
λ12 .1525† .2943† .4722† .6435† .8154† .9886† 1 1 1 1
λ11 .0335† .0676† .1103† .1513† .1921† .2326† .2704† .3477† .4306† 1
y01 .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .0582∗
y12 .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1337∗ .1165∗ .0882∗ .0659∗ .0162∗
y11 .0294∗ .0307∗ .0312∗ .0315∗ .0315∗ .0315∗ .0315∗ .0307∗ .0284∗ .0162∗
y02 .6087 .5243 .4097 .3647 .3338 .3127 .3113 .2865∗ .2277∗ .0582∗
Note that for r =0 .01 the set of binding ﬁrst order constraints (10) includes binding inequality constraint
for λ1
02 w h i c hi sn o ts h o w ni nt h et a b l e .
Table 4: Optima when u(y)=x0.2 (continued). argmax[u(y) − y]=0 .1337.
r 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.50 2.00 3.00
α 0 0 .2483 .2489 .2498 .2522 .2551 .2647 .2795 .2321
δ 0 0 .1741 .1751 .1763 .1789 .1818 .1901 .2018 .1762
p0 .3689 .3739 .3660 .3674 .3686 .3708 .3727 .3768 .3810 .3920
p1 .3770 .3705 .3970 .3970 .3970 .3974 .3977 .3993 .4016 .3908
p2 .2551 .2556 .2370 .2356 .2344 .2318 .2296 .2239 .2174 .2172
λ01 .9538† 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ11 .6608† .6963† 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
y01 .1337∗ .1317∗ .0640∗ .0610∗ .0582∗ .0531∗ .0488∗ .0387∗ .0282∗ .0201∗
y12 .0323∗ .0291∗ .0181∗ .0171∗ .0162∗ .0145∗ .0131∗ .0100∗ .0071∗ .0044∗
y11 .0213∗ .0203∗ .0181∗ .0171∗ .0162∗ .0145∗ .0131∗ .0100∗ .0071∗ .0044∗
y02 .1402∗ .1317∗ .0640∗ .0610∗ .0582∗ .0531∗ .0488∗ .0387∗ .0282∗ .0201∗
18